A classic characterization of competitive equilibria views them as feasible allocations maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. It has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notion, such as existence, determinacy, and computability. However, it fails for economies with missing …nancial markets.
Introduction
If no …nancial markets are missing, following Lange (1942) and Allais (1943) , interior allocations of given resources are competitive equilibria if and only if they solve the program max x h =r W (x) for some strictly positive ; with W being the social welfare function
The parameters in Lange's social welfare function capture the relative importance of households' welfare. This characterization has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notionexistence, Negishi (1960) and Bewley (1969) , determinacy with in…nitely lived households, Kehoe and Levine (1985) , and computability, Mantel (1971) .
If some …nancial markets are missing as in Radner (1972) , however, this equivalence fails: some interior competitive equilibria need not solve the program max x h =r W (x) for any strictly positive : Moreover, no natural social welfare function W has been found that would rescue this implication.
We extend the characterization to economies with some missing …nancial markets, by amending the social welfare function. Thus interior allocations of given resources are competitive equilibria if and only if they solve the program max x h =r W ; (x) for some parameters 2 D; 2 M living in certain spaces, with W ; being the social welfare function
Here, the social evaluation of allocations is described by the usual weights on households'welfare, and by new charges on their future consumption. The parameter is interpreted classically, whereas is interpreted as the "disagreement" among households as to the "value" of the "missing …nancial markets," as justi…ed below.
Why does it fail, the equivalence of competitive equilibria and maxima of (1), if some …nancial markets are missing? On the one hand, any allocation x that maximizes this is Pareto e¢ cient. Indeed, if y were Pareto superior to
for any 0; so x could not be a maximum for any 0. On the other hand, some allocations x that are competitive equilibria of incomplete …nancial markets are Pareto ine¢ cient. Indeed, for almost every initial allocation, every competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto ine¢ cient-for an exposition of this well known fact, see Magill and Quinzii (1996) . 2 So some competitive equilibria fail to maximize (1) for any 0: We explain in what sense the parameter is the "disagreement" among households as to the "value" of the "missing …nancial markets," by clarifying each of these terms. By "missing …nancial markets" we mean the orthogonal complement a ? of the span of the existing …nancial instruments a: By "value" of the missing …nancial markets we mean a linear functional v : a ? ! R: The Riesz representation theorem 1 Lange characterizes Pareto optima in this way. So the above characterization follows from the two welfare theorems. (Lange (1942) is aware of the …rst one, while Allais (1953) is among the …rst to rigourously prove the second one.) 2 If there are multiple goods and enough missing …nancial markets, even the equilibrium use of the existing …nancial markets is generically Pareto ine¢ cient, as shown by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) , who pioneer the application of transversality to equilibrium welfare. The intuition for this is due to Stiglitz (1982 Our main conclusions are about the following set, given some smooth preferences u 'a la Debreu (1972) , some state-contingent resources r; and some …nitely many …nancial instruments a: Namely, the set X of all interior competitive equilibrium allocations arising from some income distribution e h = r compatible with the resources. The …rst result (theorem 1) is that an allocation x 0 is an equilibrium allocation if and only if it solves the program max x h =r W ; (x) for some ( ; ) 2 D M; where
We see that the "welfare"parameter is normalized in a standard way, and the "disagreement"parameter re ‡ects properties (i) and (ii) above. The second result (proposition 1, part A) identi…es the ( ; ) from the equilibrium allocation as being
Thus h is the inverse of the marginal utility of present consumption, as usual, and is, as interpreted above, the disagreement among households as to the value of the missing …nancial markets, where each household's "value"v h is concretized as the marginal rates at which it substitutes consumption in future states for consumption in the present state. Here, the abstract notion of "value" as a linear functional v : a ? ! R is made concrete by the idea of marginal willingness to pay as 7 ! M RS; the inner product of the in…nitesimal change in future consumption against the marginal rates of substitution M RS. The third result (theorem 2) is that the relation x $ ( ; ) between X $ D M is a bijection, smooth in both directions. This implies immediately that the dimension of X equals the dimension of D M; which is easily shown to be (H 1)(1 + m) where m is the number of missing …nancial markets. This nests a well known fact about complete markets, where m = 0 : the interior Pareto optima (which are X by the two welfare theorems) have dimension H 1; cf. proof of 5.2.4 in Balasko (1988) .
We restrict attention to an exchange economy that, for simplicity, has a single good per state and assets paying o¤ in terms of it. However, our results extend to the case of multiple goods per state and any assets paying o¤ linearly in the goods'prices, with the social welfare function and arguments being almost identical. For this more general setting, Tirelli (2008) develops a parameterization of equilibria, alternate to the x $ ( ; ) here, emphasizing their geometry over the social welfare function they optimize. He then applies the parameterization to derive the constrained ine¢ ciency of equilibria in the sense of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) .
By way of application, we suggest the problem of computing equilibria of incomplete …nancial markets. This problem has its analogue with complete …nancial markets, for which many algorithms and their convergence properties are available. One such algorithm is Mantel's (1971), a dynamic system in the welfare weights given initial endowments e :
h where x solves the -program max x h =r W (x) and p is its Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, with W as in (1). Clearly, a rest point _ = 0 corresponds to an allocation x that is resource-feasible, and Marshallian-optimal relative to prices p ; so that x 2 X: He shows that if the utilities de…ne excess demands for which goods are gross-substitutes-known to imply unique equilibrium prices-and are homothetic, then this dynamic system is globally stable. Our characterization suggests that a natural idea for computing equilibria of incomplete …nancial markets a; would be to amend his dynamic system to one in the parameters ; ; and amend his condition for global stability. The paper proceed as follows. Section 2 spells out the model and assumptions. Section 3 develops the characterization. Section 4 re…nes the characterization, computing the dimension of X: Section ?? contains the more formalistic and less insightful proofs.
Economy and equilibria
Primitives There are h = 1; :::; H households who know the present state of nature 0 but are uncertain as to which future state of nature s = 1; :::; S will occur. In each state a nonstorable good is available for consumption, and in state 0 there are assets j = 1; :::; J available for trade.
Real economy The resource r 2 R S+1 ++ of the good is state-contingent, and the income distribution e across households is compatible, := n e 2 R
H(S+1) ++
: e h = r o . Each asset j pays o¤ in the future a state-contingent amount a j 2 R S of the good, summarized by a matrix a 2 R S J : 3 Asset markets are
Markets Markets specify that each asset j is tradeable at a price of q j units of the good in the present, by specifying q = p 0 a (row) for some state prices p 2 R S ++ : Q R J denotes such asset prices.
Households are free to trade any amount 
Remark 1
The payo¤ s a of the assets and the resources r of the good are …xed throughout the paper. This is important in interpreting the dimensions reported in section 4.
Consumption The consumption correspondence from asset prices q 2 Q and one's income
The asset trade is any function : Q R
S+1
++ ! R J from asset prices and one's income. Each household has an asset trade h ; by which it transforms its income into consumption, x h (q; e h ) := e h + W h (q; e h ):
Trades are optimal if there is a utility function
We denote by E; T; X the sets of equilibria, no-trade equilibria, equilibrium allocations-an equilibrium allocation is any x for which (q; x) 2 T for some q 2 Q:
Assumptions
Assumption 1 In the economy, the income distribution is strictly positive (e 2 ) and no assets are redundant (a has rank J):
Assumption 2 Trades by h are optimal with respect to utility u h :
is negative de…nite), and boundary averse (8x
An instrumental notion is each household's r h (marginal rates of substitution), the row-vector
It is instrumental because of a well known implication of the assumptions, that the optimal asset trades h (q; e h ) are C 1 and characterized as the unique solution of r h a q = 0 ( ) while evaluating r h at e h + W h :
Equilibrium allocations characterized
We characterize equilibria as solutions of the program max x h =r W ; (x) for some parametric social welfare function W ; ; where the parameters satisfy a speci…c restriction, ( ; ) 2 P: The social welfare function in question, given parameters ( ; ) 2 R H R HS ; is
where h = (0; h ) 2 R S+1 simply prepends to the row vector h a coordinate with value zero.
Key to the characterization is a function ( (x); (x)) from income distributions to the ambient space R H R HS ; given by
where
by assumption 3. Since the dependence of r h on x h ; and of t; r on x is understood, it is being omitted.
In a nutshell, the logic of the characterization has two steps. In the "necessity step" (proposition 1), we show that if x 0 is an equilibrium allocation, then it solves the program for ( ; ) = ( (x); (x)); the value of (6) at the equilibrium allocation, and in turn ( (x); (x)) satis…es speci…c restrictions. It is then natural to de…ne, independently of the social welfare function (5) or the function (6), the subset P R H R HS of all points satisfying these restrictions. In the "su¢ ciency step" (proposition 2), we show that an allocation x that solves the program for some ( ; ) 2 P is an equilibrium allocation, and in turn ( ; ) must be ( (x); (x)); the value of (6) at the maximum. We include all proofs in the body of the paper because they are insightful and simple.
Proposition 1 (necessity) If x 0 is an equilibrium allocation, then
(A) it solves the program max x h =r W ; (x) for the ( ; ) = ( (x); (x)) in (6) (B) ( (x); (x)) satis…es the restrictions (x) 0;
Proof. Part A Feasibility: x h = r holds because x is an equilibrium allocation. Maximality: By the easy half of Kuhn-Tucker, it su¢ ces that x maximizes
for some 2 R S+1 ; say, := t(1; r) 0 with t; r as in (7). Note W ; (x) t(1; r) x h is concave, given = (x) 0. So it is maximized at x 0; the equilibrium allocation, so long as its derivative is zero there. Its derivative with respect to x (6), this is
Recalling de…nition (4), this is zero indeed. Part B (x) 2 D : De…nitions (6), (7) immediately imply the Let us de…ne the sets
Whereas these sets are de…ned independently of the auxiliary function (6), conclusion (B) does refer to the auxiliary function (6) . Yet it is possible to paraphrase conclusion (B) in terms of these sets: ( (x) Proof. Part B That x 2 argmax 0 follows from the boundary aversion in assumption 3 and 0: Further, the harder half of Kuhn-Tucker implies that x maximizes
(Here we use that W ; is concave and x h = r linear, so that the constraint quali…cation automatically holds.) Since x 0; the derivative must be zero:
Equation (9) 
This states is the (x) in (6). And equation (12) implies for states 1 = f1; :::; Sg that
on substituting conclusion (10) and de…nition (4). This and the hypothesis 2 M (so that h = 0),
This states is the (x) in (6). Part A By de…nition of equilibrium allocation, we are to show that (q; x) 2 T is a no-trade equilibrium, i.e.
h (q; x h ) = 0; for some asset prices q 2 Q: By ( ), this is equivalent to r h a q = 0 while evaluating r h at the x h + W 0 = x h ; for some q 2 Q: It su¢ ces that this be true for, say, q := ra with r as in (7). That is, it su¢ ces that r h a ra = 0
while evaluating at x h : Now, (12) Putting together part (A) of propositions 1 and 2 yields our characterization of equilibria:
5 Theorem 1 Suppose x 0: Then it is an equilibrium allocation i¤ it solves max x h =r W ; (x) for some ( ; ) 2 D M:
We remark that if asset markets are complete, then a ? = f0g and M = f0g and = 0 necessarily,
In particular, if asset markets are complete, theorem 1 simply concludes that
x is an equilibrium allocation if and only if it solves max x h =r h u h (x h ) for some 2 D-the classical characterization.
As an aside, there is a separate characterization, which does not even refer to social welfare functions. The proof is relegated to the appendix, and simply recycles the arguments above. 
Dimension of equilibrium allocations
Here, we state a version of the characterization that is stronger by the fact it claims the above relation x $ ( ; ) is a di¤eomorphism-a bijection, smooth in both directions. If the utilities are time separable u(x) = u 0 (x 0 ) + u 1 (x 1 ); and we think of the inverse of (6), we see determines the distribution of present consumption x 0 , and, given ; determines the distribution of future consumption x 1 . By way of caveat, the dimensions reported here are to be interpreted for …xed asset payo¤s a and resources r: uniquely determines
Theorem 2 nests a well known fact about complete markets, where S = J : the interior Pareto optima (which are X by the two welfare theorems) have dimension H 1; cf. proof of 5.2.4 in Balasko (1988).
Corollary 3
The equilibria E are a (H 1)J vector bundle on T; hence a smooth (H 1)(S+1)-manifold.
To see why this is the dimension, note that E; as locally the Cartesian product of T and a vector space of dimension (H 1)J; must have dimension
Corollary 3 agrees with a well known fact about complete markets, where S = J : the equilibrium manifold given …xed resources has dimension (H 1)(#goods); cf. chapter 5 in Balasko (1988) .
Remark 3 (multiple goods) If there are multiple goods per state and assets pay o¤ in the numéraire, theorem 2 holds exactly as stated-so the dimension of T stays the same.
Theorem ??
To show that X is a manifold di¤eomorphic to D M (itself a manifold), it su¢ ces to show that there exist 
Claim and are well de…ned, C 1 ; and satisfy both conditions. is well-de…ned and C 1 Obvious given assumption 3.
is well-de…ned , i.e.
( ; ) exists, is unique, and in R H(S+1) ++
. The arg max exists by Weiertrass's theorem, because in (13) the objective is continuous and the feasible set compact. The arg max is unique because, …rst, arg max 0 given the Inada condition in assumption 3, and, second, the objective is strictly concave in the interior given the concavity condition in assumption 3.
is = id Given ( ; ) 2 D M, de…ne x := arg max in (13) . We want (x) = ; (x) = in the sense of (6) . Part B of proposition 2 says so.
Finally, we provide the Proof. of corollary 3. By de…nition, X is the image of the projection E ! ; (q; e) = (e h + W h (q; e h )) h : Its …bers 1 (x) are clearly 1 (x) = fr j x ag e 2 : 8h; e h = x h h for some h 2 span(W ) using remark ??. So …bers are parameterized (smoothly in x) by an open set of h>1 in span(W ) H 1 -here e 1 = x 1 + h>1 h -which is a convex set of dimension (H 1)J:
